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NOTE
THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA AND
SECTION 339 OF THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS:

A CASE STUDY OF OPINION-WRITING

*

I. THE ADOPTION OF A RESTATEMENT PROVISION

Section 339 of the Restatement of Torts governs landholder liability
to trespassing children. It provides:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm to
young children trespassing thereon caused by a structure or other
artificial condition which he maintains upon the land, if
(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon
which the possessor knows or should know that such children
are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or should
know and which he realizes or should realize as involving an
unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such
children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in
coming within the area made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is
slight as compared to the risk to young children involved
therein.'
In 1949 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Bartleson v. Glen Alden
Coal Co.. announced that "to the extent that past cases are in conflict with
the view of section 339 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, which we
have adopted, they are no longer authority." 3 The court's declaration
suggests that a substantial change in the law was being accomplished. This
conclusion is reinforced by statements appearing in earlier Pennsylvania
cases that section 339 represented an affirmative recognition of the value
* This Note represents the second in the Review's Pennsylvania Project. See
Note, Use of Prior Crimes To Affect Credibility and Penalty in Pennsylvania, 113
U. PA. L. REv. 382 (1964). Tort liability to child trespassers was chosen as the
subject of this case study since, being relatively well-settled, it highlights the nonsubstantive aspects of the opinion-writing of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
1
RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 339 (1934).
2361 Pa. 519, 64 A.2d 846 (1949), 54 Dicx. L. REv. 102.

3 Id. at 529, 64 A2d at 851.

(563)

564

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.113:562

of child life to the community, 4 rather than a narrow exception to a basic
policy of free land use by property owners.5
Consideration of the earlier Pennsylvania decisions reveals, however,
that the standards imposed on landowners by section 339 represented no
significant change. Prior to adoption of section 339, the principles governing landowner liability were the so-called "attractive nuisance" doctrine
and the "playground" rule. Under the former a landlord was liable for
injuries to a child trespasser stemming from his failure to use due care
in the maintenance of a dangerous and alluring artificial condition on the
land. The latter principle created an exception to the general rule of no
duty to trespassers by imposing a duty of ordinary care upon the possessor
of premises on which there was a dangerous instrumentality and which
had been recurrently used by children as a play area prior to the injury.
While the two doctrines were referred to as alternatives, 6 with a single
exception 7 there is no reported instance where an appellate court permitted
recovery without a showing of frequent and notorious prior use of the
premises involved. Because a showing of prior use was essential to recovery under the playground rule and was also the element rendering it
more stringent than the attractive nuisance doctrine, to say that the latter
afforded a separate and additional source of liability was misleading.8

Treating the playground rule as the pre-339 law governing liability
to child trespassers, it must be emphasized that the rule did not create
liability for all injuries incurred by children on such premises, but merely
imposed a duty of ordinary care on the landholder. 9 This entailed weighing
considerations such as the nature and severity of the risks involved in the
condition against its utility to the possessor and the extent of the burden
imposed on him to protect against the danger. 10 These are the considera4 See, e.g., Thompson v. Reading Co., 343 Pa. 585, 591-92, 23 A.2d 729, 732 (1942),
16 TEMP.L.Q. 349, 90 U. PA. L. Rv. 864.
5 See, e.g., Wright v. Pennsylvania R.R., 314 Pa. 222, 171 At. 593 (1934). See
generally ELDREDGE, MODERN TORT PROBLEMS 189-204 (1941).
6 See, e.g., Powell v. Ligon, 334 Pa. 250, 5 A.2d 373 (1939); Fitzpatrick v.
Penfield, 267 Pa. 564, 572, 109 At. 653, 656 (1920); Note, 7 U. PiTr. L. REv. 36
(1940).
7 Hydraulic Works Co. v. Orr, 83 Pa. 332 (1877).
8 The necessity of proof that the child was allured onto the premises by the
attractive structure, the absence of which was fatal to recovery in the leading case
of United Zinc & Chem. Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268 (1922), was not made clear in
the Pennsylvania cases. Compare Costanza v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 276 Pa. 90, 119
Ad. 819 (1923) (express rejection), with Rapczynski v. W. T. Cowan, Inc., 138 Pa.
Super. 392, 10 A.2d 819 (1939).
9 Hogan v. Etna Concrete Block Co., 325 Pa. 49, 188 At. 763 (1936) ; Fitzpatrick
v. Penfield, 267 Pa. 564, 109 Atl. 653 (1920).
I' If § 339 is regarded as imposing on landowners a duty of care toward child
trespassers unable to appreciate the danger, the effect is to treat the child trespasser
as a licensee. Courts traditionally have held that the landowner's duty toward the
latter class of persons is only to warn of hidden dangers. See MoRRs, TORTS 149-50
(1953). However, one recent case has held that when the licensee is too young for
a warning to be effective, the owner is required to remove the dangerous condition.
Paulson v. Jarmulowicz, 128 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 1964). Since a landowner would
satisfy his duty of care under § 339 by warning trespassing children if he makes them
aware of the danger, the duty imposed for child trespassers is the same as that for
licensees.
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tions focused on by clauses (b) and (d) of section 339. In addition
clause (c) preserved at least something of the early doctrine of contributory
negligence as a bar to recovery." One potentially significant difference
between the playground rule and the 339 formulation was the question
of a requirement of prior use, since the former required frequent actual
use as a play area, while 339(a) speaks of a "place where . . . the possessor knows or should know that . . . children are likely to trespass."
However, in each of the decisions allowing recovery under section 339,
there was substantial evidence of prior use of the premises as a playground.' 2 Also, the court continued to cite pre-339 cases as indicative
of the standards of liability. This is not to suggest that there has been no
change in the standards governing an injured child's chances to recover,
or in the attitude of the court toward this type of suit.13 In fact in Rush
v. Plains Township,14 the court specifically stated that there was insufficient
evidence to establish the premises as a playground, yet indicated that
section 339(a) had been satisfied.15 However, the fact remains that 339
did not represent any fundamental shift in policy or approach.' 6
The question may be fairly raised whether, in view of the likelihood
of confusion and uncertainty within the lower courts and among members
of the bar, a court should "adopt" a new rule unless attempting a major
substantive change. However, the adoption of section 339 seems sound
even conceding that, as a general proposition, it is unwise to effect a modest
change through this method. Section 339 has been regarded as the "most
successful single achievement" of the Restatement of Torts 17 and is generally used as the basic guide in the child trespasser area.'8 Moreover,
even though 339 is not a drastic departure from prior law, there is some
advantage in having a clear and systematic articulation of the prevailing
legal formula.
As noted previously, the "adoption" of a new rule of law presents
risks of confusion and uncertainty; in fact the risks created by the adoption
of a rule making only minor changes may be greater than those created
by a change of major dimensions. Consider the declaration in Bartleson
overruling prior cases to the extent that they conflicted with section 339:
when differences between the old and the new are slight, considerable
11 See, e.g., Dolena v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Co., 324 Pa. 228, 188 Atl. 112

(1936),
for the pre-339 standards of contributory fault
12

Hyndman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 396 Pa. 190, 152 A.2d 251 (1959) ; Cooper v.
Reading, 392 Pa. 452, 140 A.2d 792 (1958); Bartleson v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 361
Pa. 519, 64 A.2d 846 (1949) ; Patterson v. Palley Mfg. Co., 360 Pa. 259, 61 A.2d 861
(1948) ; Mussolino v. Coxe Bros., 357 Pa. 10, 53 A.2d 93 (1947) ; Allen v. Silverman,
355 Pa. 471, 50 A.2d 275 (1947); Altenbach v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 349 Pa. 272,
37 A.2d 429 (1944) ; Thompson v. Reading Co., 343 Pa. 585, 23 A.2d 729 (1942).
'3 Compare Fitzpatrick v. Penfield, 267 Pa. 564, 109 Atl. 653 (1920), with Patterson v. Palley Mfg. Co., mipra note 12.
14 371 Pa. 117, 89 A.2d 200 (1952).
14 Id. at 120-21, 89 A.2d at 201..
16 See Euiasu, op. cit. supra note 5, at 190.
17
PRossm, TORTS § 76, at 440 (2d ed. 1955).
18 See ibid.
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litigation can be expected over questions of whether or not particular
prior decisions are "in conflict" with the new rule. On the other hand a
drastic change in the substantive law would be likely to make apparent the
current status of the prior law. Thus under the circumstances surrounding
the adoption of section 339, a major task confronting the court was the
clarification of the status of pre-339 law.

II.

DELINEATION OF THE STATUS OF FORMER DOCTRINES

A. The Continued Vitality of the General Rules
1. Pre-Bartleson Decisions
The major obligation upon the court in adopting a new formulation
of the rules governing liability to child trespassers was to indicate the
extent to which section 339 coincided with or displaced the attractive
nuisance doctrine and the playground rule. While after Bartleson this task
became one of designating the status of particular prior decisions, the court's
task during the period in which section 339 was resorted to concurrently
with the older rules was to point up the overlaps and variances between
339 and the early formulations.
In the first case giving substantial attention to section 339, Thompson
v. Reading Co.,19 the court made clear that the attractive nuisance doctrine's
allurement requirements were no longer operative. 20 However, this was of
limited value, since, as pointed out above, the attractive nuisance doctrine
had no real vitality independent of the playground rule. The important
task was to define what continued role, if any, the playground rule was
to play, in which respect the court was not helpful. In Thompson the
injury occurred on a railroad turntable, and there was a Pennsylvania decision on all fours denying recovery. 2 ' The case came before the supreme
court on appeal from a nonsuit grounded on the theory of no duty to
trespassers to maintain property in a safe condition, so that to reverse the
court did not have to, and did not, do more than declare that there was a
legal duty to a child trespasser in this situation. Thus, while the opinion
contained an extensive discussion of section 339, it also marshalled a great
deal of precedent showing that Pennsylvania had recognized such a duty
in appropriate circumstances. In this posture the case was not an appropriate vehicle for a thorough exploration of the impact of section 339 on
prior law.
The playground rule did constitute the plaintiff's theory of recovery
in the next child trespasser case, Prokop v. Becker.22 The court concluded
that plaintiff had not shown sufficient prior use of the defendant's property
19 343 Pa. 585, 23 A.2d 729 (1942).
20
Id. at 591-92, 23 A.2d at 132-33. This reading was recognized by the court
in Bartleson v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 361 Pa. 519, 526, 64 A.2d 846, 850 (1949).
21 See Thompson v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 218 Pa. 444, 67 At. 768 (1907).
22 345 Pa. 607, 29 A.2d 23 (1942).
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to have it classed as a playground, but went on to state that even if there
had been such prior use, there would not have been liability, because the
owner was not under a duty of care where the danger was obvious to the
trespassing children. In reaching this result the court reasoned that the
duty owed to trespassing children by the owner of a playground requires
no greater caution than is called for by section 3 39.23 Thus, while the
court appeared to preserve the playground rule, its independent status was
severely undermined, for after Prokop it became senseless for a plaintiff
to allege and attempt to prove a "playground" cause of action if the requirements of section 339 could be satisfied. This is because 339(a) does
not require more extensive prior use than does the playground rule, and
the requirements embodied in 339(b), (c), and (d) have to be met under
either theory. 24 While it would have simplified matters greatly if at this
stage the court had stated that the playground rule no longer had significance in Pennsylvania, it must be remembered that the court had not
yet expressly adopted section 339 as the law on this subject, and the question of its adoption was not then squarely before the court. Hence,
it is understandable that the cases prior to Bartleson v. Glen Alden
Coal Co. 25 involving injury to child trespassers employed the two rules
26
indiscriminately.
2. The Playground Rule After Bartleson
In the five years following the adoption of section 339,27 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided six cases involving injury to child
trespassers; 28 in each the court worked with the language of section 339
and in no way invoked the playground rule. But in Scibelli v. Pennsylvania
2
3Id.
at 610, 29 A.2d at 25. The court went on to hold that the child had realized
the risk, so that clause (c) of § 339 was not satisfied. See text accompanying notes
39-40 infra.
2
4 There is no instance of the playground rule being applied so as to provide a
cause of action in a situation excluded by the language of any part of § 339. For
example § 339 requires that "a structure or other artificial condition" be the cause
of the child's injury; no pre-339 case allowed recovery absent an artificial condition.
See Nichol v. Bell. Tel. Co., 266 Pa. 463, 469-70, 109 Atl. 649, 651 (1920) (dictum).
25 361 Pa. 519, 64 A.2d 846 (1949).
26 See Patterson v. Palley Mfg. Co., 360 Pa. 259, 61 A.2d 861 (1948) ; Allen v.
Silverman, 355 Pa. 471, 50 A.2d 275 (1947); Gourley v. Pittsburgh, 353 Pa. 112,
44 A.2d 270 (1945); Altenbach v. Lehigh Valley R1R., 349 Pa. 272, 37 A.2d 429
(1944).
27 A comment on Bartleson, 54 DICK. L. REv. 102 (1949), properly concluded
that the playground rule no longer had any utility; however, its assumption that the
rule had been discarded was premature.
28 Rush v. Plains Township, 371 Pa. 117, 89 A.2d 200 (1952) ; Jennings v. Glen
Alden Coal Co., 369 Pa. 532, 87 A.2d 206 (1952); Verrichia v. Society Di M. S.
Del Lazio, 366 Pa. 629, 79 A.2d 237 (1951) ; McGuire v. Carey, 366 Pa. 627, 79
A2d 236 (1951) ; Gallagher v. Frederick, 366 Pa. 450, 77 A2d 427 (1951) ; Bruce v.
Pittsburgh Housing Authority, 365 Pa. 571, 76 A.2d 400 (1950).
While there was injury to a child trespasser in Shaw v. Pennsylvania R.R., 374
Pa. 8, 96 A.2d 923 (1953), and the court did not deal with § 339, the case came within
the "permissive crossing" rule, a separate Pennsylvania doctrine.

568

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Voi.113:562

R.R.,29 the court's opinion was written as if section 339 did not exist,30
disposing of the case solely on the playground rule. The property in this
case was an open tract of land near a residential area where children often
played and through which a single-track spur line passed. The seven-yearold plaintiff was playing there with other children when a train entered the
area and stopped. Plaintiff was seriously injured when the train began
to move just as he attempted to jump onto a flat car, as some of his playmates had done. While the plaintiff's attorney relied largely on the playground rule,3 1 this does not justify the court's analysis of the case on that
ground. If section 339 was adopted mainly because it was a clear articulation of the legal standards in this area, the court forsook its essential purpose in allowing the rules to co-exist. Furthermore, the court's reliance
upon the playground rule may well have affected the outcome of the case.
The court denied recovery; yet, in Rush v. Plains Township,3 2 the immediately preceding decision in this line of cases, the court stated that although there was insufficient evidence of a playground, clause (a) of sec33
tion 339 had been satisfied.
In the next child trespasser case, Dugan v. Pennsylvania R.R.,3 the
court stated that section 339 "supersedes and supplants the doctrine of
'attractive nuisance' and the 'playground rule' . .. .,35 This declaration seems to be a belated realization by the court of its prior failure to
clarify the relation of section 339 to the older doctrine, for it was made
gratuitously, rather than in the context of the immediate case before it.
While the court did not choose the most propitious time for or manner of
declaring the lack of vitality of the playground rule, its action indicates
the value in a court's standing back from the case before it to survey a
series of decisions, assessing and articulating just what principles have or
should have emerged.
29379

Pa. 282, 108 A.2d 348 (1954).

30 The sole mention of § 339 was an "analogy" citation in a footnote to the

court's opinion. Id. at 290, 108 A.2d at 353. Mr. Justice Musmanno made no reference
to the section in a seventeen page dissent.
Moreover, the court failed to cite either Bartleson or the six cases following it
that applied § 339. See cases cited note 28 mpra. In fact the court regarded as
controlling on one aspect of the case Shaw v. Pennsylvania R.R., 374 Pa. 8, 96 A.2d
923 (1953), a case turning upon an altogether separate Pennsylvania tort doctrine.
See note 28 supra.
31 The brief of plaintiff-appellant completely ignores the existence of § 339.
32 371 Pa. 117, 89 A.2d 200 (1952).
33 Actually, the court's decision in Scibelli represents an exceptionally narrow
construction of the playground rule itself. The court found that the area surrounding
the tracks was a playground, but that this was not equivalent to "consent" to jump
onto the passing trains. To separate the danger posed by the trains from the defendant's duty of ordinary care as to the surrounding area is unrealistic and inconsistent with several prior decisions applying the playground rule. See Costanza v.
Pittsburgh Coal Co., 276 Pa. 90, 119 At. 819 (1923); Gawronski v. McAdoo, 266
Pa. 449, 109 AUt. 763 (1920). It is also out of line with the Bartleson decision, in
which the high-tension electric tower on which plaintiff was injured had always been
isolated by a fence with a locked gate, but the play in the surrounding area was
sufficient to satisfy § 339(a).
34 387 Pa. 25, 127 A.2d 343 (1956).
35 Id. at 31, 127 A.2d at 346.
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B. The Treatment of a Pervasive Issue-ContributoryFault
To the extent that section 339 did not itself take a clear position on a
specific issue, it was necessary for the court to give special consideration to
the status of prior law on that issue. Thus clause (c) stipulates as a condition for recovery by trespassing children that "because of their youth
[they] do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it .

.

.

."

While this clearly bars recovery by the child who

realizes the risk, it does not provide an answer when the risk was not
realized but where children of similar age and experience would have done
so. The comments to the Restatement are not helpful in resolving this
issue 3 6 and courts in other jurisdictions have reached different conclusions
while purporting to follow section 339(c). 7 While this issue ordinarily
is a question of the appropriate jury charge, it is nonetheless important to
the bar and to the lower courts that the controlling standard be articulated
clearly and consistently.
Pennsylvania cases have generally enunciated the standard for determining the contributory negligence of children as being "the child's capacity
to appreciate the danger involved .

.

.

. This capacity is usually deter-

mined by the understanding expected from children of like age, intelligence
and experience." 38 Particularly since the Restatement does not take a
position, there would be every reason for the court to employ its usual
standard to section 339 cases. The fact that the latter speaks in terms of
"risk realization" rather than of "contributory negligence" is not conclusive;
both can be viewed as characterizations of a similar standard of contributory fault.
The meaning of clause (c) was squarely dealt with in Prokop v.
Becker,39 the first child trespasser decision after the court had given substantial attention to section 339. The court stated: "The use of the verb
do [in clause (c)] might lead to the belief that the duty of care depended
entirely upon what the child in fact realized instead of upon what he should
have realized. That such is not the case, however, is readily apparent from
comment b . ... , 40 While comment b is not especially revealing, the
opinion did cite pre-339 cases enunciating the prior Pennsylvania stand36

§ 339(c), comment (1934). Neither does RESTATEmENT,
which attempts to define the "reasonable man"
standard for children, provide much guidance, nor does § 464(2), dealing with the
contributory negligence standard for children. While comment e to § 283 begins with a
thoroughly objective standard-conduct is to be judged by the behavior expected from
children of like age, intelligence, and experience-it concludes that with regard to
the child's capacity to realize the existence of a risk, the individual qualities of the
child are to be taken into account.
37 Compare Nechodomu v. Lindstrom, 273 Wis. 313, 77 N.W.2d 707, 78 N.W.2d
417 (1956) (subjective), with Larnel Builders, Inc. v. Martin, 110 S.2d 649 (Fla.
RESTATEMENT, TORTS

TORTS § 283, comment e (1934),

1959) (objective).

For discussion see BELLI,

TRIAL AND TOR

TRENDS

144 (1959).

38 Koenig v. Flaherty, 383 Pa. 187, 190, 117 A.2d 719, 720 (1955); see, e.g.,
Di Meglio v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 252 Pa. 391, 97 At. 476 (1916); Crissey v.
Hestonville, M. & F.P. Ry., 75 Pa. 83 (1874).
39 345 Pa. 607, 29 A2d 23 (1942).
41 Id. at 610-11, 29 A.2d at 25.

570

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.l13:562

ard ; 41 hence the Prokop decision seemed to resolve the issue. In Patterson
v. Palley Mfg. Co.,4 this standard was reaffirmed although this case was
in the pre-Bartlesongroup and was discussed in terms of contributory negligence rather than within the language of clause (c).
However, with the Bartleson decision the issue became more complex
and the court's treatment less clearcut. In this case the eleven-year-old plaintiff was severely injured when he made contact with a high voltage wire
while climbing on defendant's transmission tower. The area surrounding
the tower often had been used as a playground, but access to the tower
always had been barred by a fence with a locked gate. The gate was left
unlocked on this occasion. In affirming a verdict for plaintiff, the court
stated that "the plaintiff did not know what the electric wires were for
and was found after explicit and adequate instructions to the jury not
guilty of contributory negligence." 43 The court failed to consider explicitly whether plaintiff, as a normal child of his age and experience, should
have realized the risks involved in his action. The dissenting judge, who
wrote the opinion in Prokop, apparently believed that the majority had
abandoned its prior standard; he emphasized that five of the plaintiff's
companions, all of whom were about his age, had testified that they knew
that defendant's tower was an electric one and were aware of the dangers
of electricity. 44 However, the contributory-negligence charge given by the
trial judge did embody as a standard the capacities of a normal child of
plaintiff's age and experience. 45 Hence, although the court in Bartleson
probably intended to continue with the established test, it introduced some
uncertainty on the issue of contributory fault by "adopting" section 339
and overruling prior inconsistent cases.
The next case to consider clause (c) of section 339, Jennings v. Glen
Alden Coal Co.,4 6 involved the drowning of a thirteen-year-old boy while
swimming in a waterhole which was created by defendant's strip mining
operations. In denying recovery in this wrongful death action, the court
removed whatever doubts the Bartleson opinion had injected as to the
appropriate standard by relying upon pre-339 cases. Furthermore, the
court used the language of 339(c), rather than that of contributory negligence, stating: "It certainly cannot be said that a normal boy thirteen and
one-half years of age who has been in and around water often enough to
have learned how to swim does not realize the risk involved in swimming
in deep water." 47
41

1Id. at 611-12, 29 A.2d at 26.
42 360 Pa. 259, 61 A.2d 861 (1948).
43 361 Pa. 519, 524, 64 A.2d 846, 849 (1949).

Id. at 530-33, 64 A2d at 851-53 (dissenting opinion).
45

Bartleson v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 40 Luzerne 391, 395 (C.P. Luzerne County,
Pa., 1948).
46369 Pa. 532, 87 A.2d 206 (1952).
.7Id. at 536, 87 A.2d at 208. (Emphasis added.)
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In Cooper v. Reading 48 and Hyndman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 49 the
next cases dealing with clause (c) of section 339, the court adhered closely
to the language of the section. Also in Cooper the court made certain of
its continuity with the past by citing Kuhns v. Brugger,50 a non-339
opinion which contains a lengthy discussion of the standard generally applicable to determinations of negligence by children. Yet, after the careful
treatment in these cases of the issues in 339(c), avoiding contributory
negligence language while still making clear that the normal-child standard
is to apply, the court threatened to vitiate all the progress by a few words
in Dragonjacv. McGaflin Constr. & Supply Co.51 In this case, the most
recent Pennsylvania decision in the area, a ten-year-old boy was injured
when he fell from a wall overlooking an excavation while playing on
premises on which defendant was erecting a school building. Realization
of risk would appear to be an important issue on these facts; yet, except for
a reference in the course of stating the facts to testimony by the plaintiff
that he knew he should not have been playing in the construction area,
the court disposed of this element of the case by a statement that the child
had "assumed the risk." 52 Not only is there a complete absence of any
analysis which might add to the understanding of what must be shown to
satisfy clause (c), but "assumption of risk" is an innovation of unknown
scope, for it comes unaccompanied by any clarifying remarks. While it
may have been intended merely to express the same type of contributory
fault as is covered by either "risk realization" or "contributory negligence,"
there is no way of knowing this. At the very least, this language will
53
provide some future appellant with grounds for attacking a jury charge.
III. JuDiciAL GLoss ON LEGAL TERMS

A. Analysis Couched in the Terms of Section 339

The unavoidable breadth and generality of the language employed in
any legal rule that purports to cover a multitude of variant fact situations
is, perhaps, the greatest problem facing the courts in applying section 339.54
The formulation provides only a framework; to be of value the meaning
of the words must be constantly, carefully refined. Hence, it is imperative
for a court deciding a section 339 case to group the facts of the case so
48 392 Pa. 452, 140 A.2d 792 (1958).

49 396 Pa. 190, 152 A.2d 251 (1959).
50 390 Pa. 331, 339-42, 135 A.2d 395, 401-02 (1957).
51409 Pa. 276, 186 A2d 241 (1962).
52 Id. at 280, 186 A2d at 243.
53 The deficiencies of the Dragonjac opinion are even more disturbing when it is
seen that several issues raised by § 339 were treated quite thoroughly in the parties'
briefs, including recurrent references to the language of the several clauses.
54 See Troutman, The Passing of the Doctrines of "Attractive Nuisance" and
"PlaygroundRule" in Pennsylvania, 62 DIcK. L. REv. 159, 162-64 (1958). See generally Green, The Tort Restatement, 29 IL. L. REv. 582, 583-90 (1935).
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as to indicate how they bear on the several clauses, and to cast its analysis
in the terms of section 339.
A comparison of several opinions gives an indication of what can be
accomplished in this respect. In Verrichiav. Society Di M. S. Del Lazio,55
an eight-year-old boy was injured when pinned under a three-hundredpound lawn roller while he and a friend were playing in the yard of defendant's club. After re-affirming that section 339 made irrelevant whether
the injury-causing structure allured plaintiff onto the premises,56 the court
stated that plaintiff must satisfy all four clauses of the section before the
possessor can be liable, paraphrased clause (b), and stated that the requirements of this clause had not been met:
The roller had been kept in the same place for many years
prior to the accident. During that time there is no evidence that
it had ever fallen or rolled free. It is common knowledge that a
roller of that size normally takes strong men to push it. In fact,
the two boys, immediately prior to the accident, had tried for three
hours to move the roller but could not because of its weight. That
the accident did happen as plaintiff testified cannot here be questioned 7 But to hold that the defendant should have anticipated
that a three hundred pound roller standing on end on level ground
would fall of its own volition would be going far beyond the
standard of care required of reasonable men.
The same result is reached if we accept the more logical assumption that the two boys caused it to fall. The roller when
placed on end was standing on its flat, circular side three feet in
diameter and extended only fourteen inches in height. In view of
its weight, it is beyond the realm of reasonable probability that two
small boys could push it over or in any way cause it to fall. That
but liability
it is possible is proven by the fact that it did happen,
58
is never imposed on the basis of mere probabilities.
The gloss on clause (b) produced in these two short paragraphs far exceeds what is accomplished in the opinions in Altenbach v. Lehigh Valley
R.R. 59 and Allen v. Silverman.' ° In the former case, in which a three-yearold drowned in a reservoir after gaining access through holes in the fence,
the court stated the facts, quoted section 339 in full, but then couched its
holding for plaintiff in terms of "negligence" and "duty of ordinary
65 366 Pa. 629, 79 A2d 237 (1951).
56Id. at 631, 79 A.2d at 238; see text accompanying note 20 supra.
57 The procedural posture of the case was an appeal by plaintiff from the trial
court's grant of a nonsuit.
58 Id. at 631-32, 79 A.2d at 238-39.

59 349 Pa. 292, 37 A,2d 429 (1944).
60 355 Pa. 471, 50 A.2d 275 (1947).
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care." 61 In the latter a five-year-old was injured when struck by a heavy
cylinder which rolled from defendant's loading platform while the child
was playing on a narrow strip of defendant's property which abutted the
sidewalk. While its decision for plaintiff appears to be correct, the court
treated all four clauses of section 339 in one entangled paragraph composed
mainly of conclusory statements.0 2
It is true that at the time of the Altenbach and Allen decisions section
339 had not yet been unequivocally adopted as the governing law in Pennsylvania; yet, in Prokop v. Becker,63 decided earlier, the court made a
concise and thorough "in terms" analysis of how the plaintiff had failed to
satisfy 339(c).64 In fact the most recent case in this line, Dragonjac v.
McGaflln Constr. & Supply Co., 65 does as little as any case to sharpen the
meaning of any element of section 339. The short opinion is divisible into
four parts, the first two consisting of a statement of the facts and a full
quotation of section 339 along with an assertion that it is the governing
law. Next the opinion contains a paragraph asserting that the facts of the
case were not meaningfully different from any situation in which a boy
might come upon one's property and be injured, as, for example, by tripping over a stone or falling while climbing a tree. It therefore concludes
that liability in this case would require the owner of every property, no
matter how small, to build a barricade or become an insurer. The final
paragraph says: "In the instant case (1) plaintiffs failed to prove that
defendant was negligent and (2) plaintiffs failed to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that defendant's negligence, if any, was the
proximate cause of the accident and (3) the minor plaintiff and his parents
assumed the risk." 66
No attempt was made to relate the facts to the various clauses of
section 339; one can only guess whether the court's language about barricading the property was made with reference to clause (d), or whether
the statement as to assumption of risk was intended to mean that clause (c)
had not been satisfied. While certain cases undoubtedly present greater
opportunities than others for clarification and refinement of legal principles,
the supreme court's decision in this case reversed a jury verdict for plaintiff and is not so obviously correct as to be justified by a casual statement
that to decide for plaintiff "would carry the doctrine of attractive nuisance
to extremes that would be absolutely ridiculous." 67 Articulating the
reasoning upon which decisions are grounded, while burdensome, serves an
invaluable two-fold function-it pressures the jurist into close, careful
61349 Pa. at 276, 37 A2d at 431.
62 355

Pa. at 474-75, 50 A2d at 277.
63-345 Pa. 607, 29 A2d 23 (1942).
64 Id.at 610-12, 29 A2d at 25-26.
65 409 Pa. 276, 186 A.2d 241 (1962).
66
Id.at 280, 186 A2d at 243.
67 Ibid.
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analysis of the facts and policies underlying the relevant legal principles,68
and results in increased clarity and refinement of the legal formulas, with
a consequent increment in their utility to the bar and, sometimes, even to
laymen. 69
The deficiency of the Dragonjac opinion is even more striking when
compared with the opinions in Hyndman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 70 Cooper
v. Reading,71 and Dugan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 72 the three cases just preceding it in this line.73 In Dugan, an eleven-year-old boy was injured when
he put his hand too close to the overhead electric wires as he was climbing
over a car on a motionless train. In reversing a jury verdict for plaintiff,
the court introduced its analysis by stating that its decision was based on
plaintiff's failure to satisfy clause (d).74 The court quoted the Restatement comment explaining clause (d), and then interpreted it as calling for
a balancing of the burden to the property owner of reducing the danger
against the degree of risk, emphasizing the relevance of the social utility
of the condition being maintained. 75 It rejected plaintiff's suggestions of
how defendant could have minimized the risk-fencing or patrolling the
railroad right-of-way-as unreasonably burdensome and pointed out that
the trains could not operate if the overhead wires were insulated. In upholding jury verdicts for plaintiff in Cooper and Hyndman, the court discussed the clauses of section 339 seriatim.76 In both opinions the facts
were stated in detail at the outset, but the key facts were repeated as they
became relevant in the discussion of the issues raised by each clause.
There was never any doubt about the clauses to which a particular analysis
was pertinent; the transitions were clear, and the court repeatedly referred
to the language of the clause in question.
B. Treating More Issues Than Necessary for Disposition
In order to recover under section 339, plaintiff must satisfy all four
clauses. Thus, unless there is a concession by defendant, the court will
have to treat all the clauses when deciding in favor of plaintiff, while to
hold for defendant, it need not treat more than one.7 7 However, the fact

See
69 See

68

ROBINSON, LAW AND THE LAWYERS 173-78 (1935).
MISHKIN & MORRIS, ON LAW IN COURTS 183 (1965).

70 396 Pa. 190, 152 A.2d 251 (1959).
71392 Pa. 452, 140 A.2d 792 (1958).
72 387 Pa. 25, 127 A.2d 343 (1956).
73 Section 339 was also referred to in Malloy v. Pennsylvania R.R., 387 Pa. 408,
128 A.2d 40 (1956), but this case turned essentially on a lack of evidence of what
had transpired.
74
387 Pa. at 32, 127 A.2d at 346.
75
Id. at 33-39, 127 A2d at 347-50. The Dragonjac opinion also quoted the relevant comments in footnotes, but made no further use of them.
76 The defendant in Hyndinan conceded that clause (a) had been met; all four
clauses were at issue in Cooper, and the court also grappled with the question of
defendant had "maintained" the condition.
whether
77
Decisions also have turned on the introductory part of § 339. See McGuire v.
Carey, 366 Pa. 627, 79 A.2d ,236 (1951) (artificial condition) ; Gallagher v. Frederick,
366 Pa. 450, 77 A.2d 427 (1951) (maintenance).
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that disposition requires discussion of only one clause does not mean that
the court should restrict itself solely to that clause, as it may often be
desirable for purposes of sharpening and settling the meaning of "multiissue rules" to have several issues analyzed together. One reason for confining discussion to the dispositive issue is to avoid the risk of making an
overly broad statement not tempered by full argument of counsel or by the
feeling of responsibility which emerges when the outcome of the case turns
upon the reasoning involved. This risk could be minimized by limiting
discussion to issues which have been thoroughly briefed and argued by
counsel, thus being "before the court" even though not essential to disposition.78 Such an approach seems appropriate for section 339 cases even
though it might not be so in other instances. Although section 339 is so
structured that failure to satisfy one requirement of the section will be dispositive, the several clauses serve more as a device for sharpening legal
issues than as a series of independent "tests" of liability. The issues arise
from a single set of circumstances constituting a personal injury, so that
the same facts often will bear upon more than one clause.
There are several cases in this line holding for defendant in which
the court did discuss more than a single clause of section 339. Bruce v.
Pittsburgh Housing Authority 79 involved an injury to a nine-year-old
when she skidded on broken glass while roller-skating in the laundry of a
housing project.80 The court reversed a verdict in favor of the child, supporting its result by showing that both clause (a) and clause (b) were
not met by plaintiff. In dealing with each clause, the court gathered the
relevant facts and explained why they were insufficient to satisfy plaintiff's
burden-in essence that it was improbable that a child would be skating in
the narrow, encumbered passageway in which the injury occurred even
though children had been known to skate in other areas of the laundry
room, and also that a few scattered pieces of broken glass did not represent
such a threat of serious bodily harm as to justify the conclusion that defendant should have realized and corrected it. Although this may be viewed
as a strict construction of section 339, the opinion nevertheless provides
a clear and useful interpretation of both clauses.
In Rush v. Plains Township,8 1 plaintiff suffered burns when the surface of the township dump on which he was playing gave way underfoot,
causing him to sink and make contact with hot coals at the bottom of the
refuse. In affirming a nonsuit the court focused essentially on the plaintiff's failure to satisfy clause (b). The discussion was somewhat superficial
and cast in conclusory terms, but it did point out that while fires were
frequently observed on a remote portion of the dump, there was no smoke
78 Compare Roosevelt Raceway, Inc. v. Monaghan, 9 N.Y.2d 293, 311-13, 174
N.E.2d 71, 79, 213 N.Y.S.2d 729, 741 (1961) (Dye, J., concurring).
79 365 Pa. 571, 76 A.2d 400 (1950).
80 It was conceded that the child was a trespasser while roller-skating through
the laundry room. Id. at 574, 76 A.2d at 402.
81371 Pa. 117, 89 A.2d 200 (1952).
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or visible evidence of fire which would have given the defendant notice
of the dangerous character of the portion of the dump on which the injury
occurred. In addition, after stating the facts bearing on the frequency with
which children had played in and around the dump, the court stated that
this usage was sufficient to satisfy clause (a), thereby adding some judicial
gloss to the language of the clause, 2 even though the discussion was not
extensive.
In Jennings v. Glen Alden Coal Co.,8 in addition to its denial of
recovery on the ground that plaintiff must have realized the risk, the court
thoroughly analyzed the case on the issue of reasonable likelihood of
trespass-clause (a). The waterhole in which the drowning occurred was
about fifty feet in diameter. It was a result of defendant's strip-mining
operations, and was located on a tract of uncultivated land one-half mile
from the nearest habitation. The evidence indicated that some boys had
swum there on one or two previous occasions, and that a few people had
occasionally hunted or picked berries in the area, there being a path leading
from the highway. This situation was found to constitute insufficient likelihood of trespass to satisfy clause (a). While it is difficult to compare
different types of premises in this respect, the opinion does seem to be
demanding a more sustained course of usage than the language of the
clause requires.8 The court's transitional statement-that "an even more
compelling reason for denying liability is found in clause (c) . . ." 8__
suggests that this might not have been the interpretation of clause (a) if
the case had turned solely on the prior usage issue. In Prokop v. Becker,8s
prior to the court's excellent treatment of clause (c), it found a substantial
87
amount of prior use by children insufficient to establish a playground.
The plaintiff's decedent was killed when struck by an airplane while
bicycling on a road running inside of the boundary fence of an airport and
adjacent to the landing field. While the owner had given the children
permission to play only in the area surrounding the hangars, there was
evidence that six or seven children had been cycling on the road a few
8
times a week.
A possible explanation for these unduly strict requirements of prior
usage is that the opinion writer wished to have an additional argument with
82
Although the court devoted few words to clause (a), its conclusion should be
given weight because the court had earlier ruled that the usage was insufficient to
satisfy the playground rule, which indicates that it had given this issue at least a
modicum of consideration. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
83 369 Pa. 532, 87 A.2d 206 (1952).
8
4 Also, the prior use of these premises does not seem to be less than that found
sufficient in Dugan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 387 Pa. 25, 127 A.2d 343 (1956).
85 369 Pa. at 536, 87 A.2d at 208.
86 345 Pa. 607, 29 A.2d 23 (1942).
87 This case was pre-Bartleson, and hence § 339 was not established as the sole
governing principle in this area. However, the decision appears to demand more
prior use than some of the preceding playground rule decisions. See, e.g., Costanza
v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 276 Pa. 90, 119 Atl. 819 (1923).
88 The record does not indicate for how long a period this had been going on.
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which to buttress his decision. If discussion of additional issues is
prompted by such motives, the benefits of such discussion would be more
than offset, since the court's conclusions would be influenced by its conclusions on other issues in the case, rather than solely by application of the
facts to the issue under discussion. This practice, then, should be avoided,
at least when the decision on the additional issue will be in a defendant's
favor.8 9 Moreover, inspection of the briefs in these cases suggests that the
court in Jennings should have refrained from consideration of an additional
issue; the plaintiff-appellant's brief was very diffuse and generally weakits treatment of clause (a) consisted of a series of quotations but virtually
no analysis of how they supported plaintiff's position. 0 In Prokop, however, both briefs were quite thorough; that of plaintiff-appellee made an
extensive presentation and analysis of the precedents supporting the argument that there was sufficient usage to establish a playground. 91
In both Verrichia v. Society Di M. S. Del Lazio9 2 and Dugan v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 93 the court limited its attention almost exclusively to a
single clause of section 339, and accomplished a thorough, intensive job,
yielding valuable judicial gloss. However, if the court intends to confine
its discussion to a single clause, it should use care in making this clear.
In Dugan the court reversed a jury verdict for plaintiffs. Although the
opinion was devoted almost entirely to clause (d), the court, in framing
the issue, appeared to have resolved additional issues: "There was evidence
in the present case, sufficient perhaps, to go to the jury, to meet the
conditions of clauses (a), (b) and (c) of § 339. But the evidence intended
to satisfy the condition of clause (d) was not such as to make this element
also a jury question." 9 However, it is not at all obvious, at least as to
clause (a), that there was enough evidence to go to the jury. While there
was evidence that children frequently played on the embankment near the
tracks, it seems open to question whether this is sufficient to give warning
of the likelihood of climbing on railroad cars; 5 testimony as to previous
incidents of such climbing was conflicting and indefinite. While a decision
on other issues, even without explanation, may provide additional guidance,
it seems likely that in this case all the court meant was that the case turned
on clause (d), and therefore it would not deal with the other clauses. It
should have been clearly stated that the court "need not consider (a),
89
In Rush the court's conclusion on clause (a) favored the plaintiff, who lost on
the issue upon which the court concentrated. See text accompanying notes 81-82
supra. In this situation even a brief discussion of an issue unnecessary to disposition
is desirable because it is not subject to the possibility of being a "makeweight."
90 See Brief for Appellant, pp. 16-19, Jennings v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 369 Pa.
532, 87 A2d 206 (1952). The appellee's brief did present the other side quite strongly,
which may account for the court's position. See Brief for Appellee, pp. 8-9, 12-15.
91 Brief for Appellee, pp. 3-22, Brief for Appellant, pp. 112-21, Prokop v. Becker,
345 Pa. 607, 29 A.2d 23 (1942).

336 Pa. 629, 79 A.2d 237 (1951).
387 Pa. 25, 127 A.2d 343 (1956).
04 Id.at 32, 127 A.2d at 346.
(Footnote omitted.)
95 The facts of this case are related in text accompanying note 74 supra.
92
93
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(b), and (c)" in order to avoid the risk of beclouding previously developed
judicial gloss.
C. Use of Precedent
Another element essential to elucidation of the formulation being applied by the court is regular reference to and discussion of other cases dealing with the same issue as that confronting the court in the case before it.
Once the issue or issues, which with section 339 means the pertinent
clause or clauses, have been pinpointed, analysis is most revealing when it
includes comparison with other cases which have faced the same problem
and dealt with the same language. An earlier interpretation of the legal
language embodies previous thought and effort and is well worth attention
on that score aloneY6 Furthermore, careful comparison with cases already
decided frequently places in bold relief the factual differences which call
for an opposite result in the case before the court. These comparisons must
be articulated in the opinions if the decisions are to have optimal meaning
and utility. Even when the result is obvious once the issues have been identified, there is still much benefit in drawing comparisons to prior decisions,
so that in later accidents the facts can be related more easily to those of
the decided cases, thus aiding attorneys in determining whether there
should be a lawsuit and enabling jurists better to dispose of the litigation
that does arise.
It is plain that sufficient use of precedent is integrally related to
demarcation and overall analysis of the issue. In this line of cases, for
example, the opinions which were careful to point out which clauses of
section 339 were in issue, and what facts bore on each, were generally the
same ones which added depth to their analysis by their treatment of
precedent.y7 The opposite is equally true. For example, at the time
the court decided Dragonjac v. McGaffin Constr. & Supply Co., 98 each
of the four clauses of section 339 had been interpreted and applied by at
least six cases. Yet, except for citing a few cases for the well-settled
proposition that section 339 was, in toto, the law of Pennsylvania, not a
single precedent was referred to, although the relevance of several was well
argued in both briefs. 99
Rush v. Plains Township 100 is a clear instance where reference to,
and comparison with, precedent would have added greatly to the quality
96 See LLEWFLLYN, THE BRAmBLE BUSH 64-66 (1951) ; MisHKIN & MoRRIs, op.
cit. supra note 69, at 71.
97
While two of the cases, Cooper v. Reading, 392 Pa. 452, 140 A.2d 792 (1958)
and Verrichia v. Society Di M. S. Del Lazio, 366 Pa.629, 79 A.2d 237 (1951), discussed
as being quite good with regard to "interms" analysis, are treated somewhat critically
below, these cases are not representative. No attempt has been made to discuss every
§ 339 case; the object has been rather to select those cases which most plainly illustrate
the various strengths and deficiencies being discussed.
98409 Pa. 276, 186 A.2d 241 (1962).

99 See generally Brief for Appellant, Brief for Appellee, Dragonjac v. McGaffin

Constr. & Supply Co., supra note 98.
1O 371 Pa. 117, 89 A.2d 200 (1952).
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of the opinion. Recovery was denied a child burned by coals at a township
dump on the ground that clause (b)-the possessor had reason to have
realized that his premises contained a risk of serious harm to such children-had not been met, there having been no detectable fire on that portion
of the dump to alert defendant's watchman of the hazard. 10 1 Passing over
the question of whether the court's decision was correct, the short "analysis
paragraph" of the opinion consisted essentially of conclusory statements,
with no attempt to distinguish any of the previous cases in which clause
(b) was held to have been satisfied. This is not to suggest that the cir10 2
cumstances in Rush were indistinguishable. Thompson v. Reading Co.
10 3
involved a railroad turntable; Altenbach v. Lehigh Valley R.R.,
a
reservoir fence in disrepair; and Bartleson v. Glen Alden Coal Co.,10 an
unlocked gate of a fence built to isolate a high-tension wire tower. The
dangerousness of the condition in each of these three cases was apparent
once it was realized that the area was likely to be trespassed upon by
children, whereas in Rush, even though children were known to frequent
the area, the circumstances giving the dump its dangerous condition were
not obvious to the agent of the possessor of the land. A short discussion of
this distinction would have enhanced the Rush opinion, shedding light on
some of the considerations embodied in clause (b). The brief of plaintiffappellant did argue that Thompson, Altenbach, and Bartleson were on
point,10 5 so that the cases were brought to the court's attention. The
condition in Rush also raised a significant contrast to the condition in
Bruce v. Pittsburgh Housing Authority.'0 8 In the latter case the court
held that the decision against the plaintiff on clause (b) turned on the fact
that the scattered glass fragments in the laundry room 107 did not have
the requisite potential for serious harm, even assuming that the possessor
of the premises knew of their presence.' 0 8 It would have been enlightening
for the Rush opinion to deal with this distinction, although the decision
in Bruce was also in defendant's favor, and the court therefore had no
need for distinguishing it.
The opinion in Bruce is in sharp contrast to that in Rush. In a single
sentence 109 the court stated that the broken glass on the floor did not

possess the potential for serious bodily harm inherent in an uninsulated
4000-volt wire (the condition in Bartleson), an undermined wall (referring
101 See text accompanying note 81 supra.
102 343
103

Pa. 585, 23 A.2d 729 (1942).

349 Pa. 272, 37 A.2d 429 (1944).

104 361 Pa. 519, 64 A.2d 846 (1949).
See Brief for Appellant, pp. 22-24, Rush v. Plains Township, 371 Pa. 117,
89 A.2d 200 (1952).
108 365 Pa. 571, 76 A.2d 400 (1950).
107 The facts are related in text accompanying note 80 supra.
108 The Verrichia case, involving the lawn roller, see text following note 55
supra, could have been similarly distinguished.
109 365 Pa. 571, 577, 76 A.2d 400, 403 (1950).
'o5
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to Patterson v. Palley Mfg. Co."o), an unlocked railroad turntable
(Thompson), or a reservoir with a fence in disrepair in a populous residential section (Altenbach). This exemplifies an opinion in which nearly
all the cases on the point are gathered with a few words describing each.
This, coupled with the court's remarks about the difference in inherent
danger, briefly, but nonetheless adequately, makes the central distinction.
Verrichia v. Society Di M. S. Del Lazio,"' the first section 339 case
after Bruce, was also concerned essentially with clause (b). After a terse
analysis of plaintiff's failure to satisfy the clause because of the lack of an
inherent danger sufficient to put the possessor of the property on guard,
the court cited Bruce without elaboration. This citation leads the reader
to an opinion with an effective treatment of the precedent. Since the two
decisions were juxtaposed in the line of section 339 cases, the lack of substantial elaboration in Verrichiaseems unobjectionable. It would have been
helpful, though, for the court to explain that the case it was citing dealt
with the same point, so as to make discussion unnecessary, thereby
stressing the importance of reading the Bruce opinion.
Cooper v. Reading 12 also dealt with clause (b). In that case two
children drowned when they fell through thin ice on the surface of a pool
formed at the end of an outlet pipe belonging to defendant municipality.
The pool was shallow at its edges, but sixteen feet deep at the center, due to
erosion caused by water from the pipe. One issue was whether the defendant had reason to know of the unreasonable risk presented by the
sudden "stepoff" in the center of the otherwise shallow pool. The only
section 339 case cited on this issue was Altenbach, and there was no discussion of how it bore on the facts of the case before the court. Actually,
Altenbach was a case in which the danger was in no way concealed; the
case which the court should have considered was Rush which, like Cooper,
involved a dangerous condition not visible to the possessor.11 This is not
to assert that the court in Cooper could not have distinguished Rush; for
example, the depth of the waterhole may have been visible during the
warmer seasons, particularly when there had been little rainfall, so that
the possessor had a reasonable opportunity to discover the potential traplike condition on his property. Such a discussion would have been very
revealing as to the extent of plaintiff's burden under clause (b).
The treatment of clause (d) in Cooper should also be noted. There
is little basis for dispute in applying that clause to the Cooper facts, since
the condition had no utility and could have been corrected at little cost." 4
Hence, there was no pressure for lengthy analysis of the precedent interpreting clause (d). However, the court briefly could have indicated that
the correctives available were comparable in simplicity to a locking device
110 360 Pa.
Ill 366 Pa.
112 392 Pa.
113 Neither
114 See 392

259, 61 A.2d 861 (1948).
629, 79 A.2d 237 (1951).
452, 140 A.2d 792 (1958).
of the defendants' briefs asserted the relevance of the Rush decision.
Pa. at 465, 140 A.2d at 798.
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for the turntable in Thompson and a lock on the gate in Bartleson or
pointed out that the remedies were less burdensome than those the court
found reasonable in Patterson-immediaterazing of the weakened wall, or
stationing a night watchman until demolition was completed. At the least
the court could have mentioned that precedent bearing on clause (d) had
been thoroughly dealt with in Dugan, the case preceding Cooper in the
section 339 line.
The extent to which precedent should be discussed will vary according to the circumstances. The treatment of clause (d) precedent suggested
for the Cooper opinion would do little more than provide a reader of the
opinion with a lead to the relevant cases, but this is all that the situation
demanded. As the discussion of Bruce sought to bring out, 1 5 in some
instances a few sentences will effectively show where the case before the
court fits into the spectrum of decisions involving the same issue. Dugan
is another case where the distinction between its fact situation 116 and those
of the previous section 339 cases holding that clause (d) had been satisfied
could be revealed with a minimum of elaboration; and this was done very
effectively. In its analysis the court had characterized clause (d) as weighing the risk embodied in the condition against its social utility and the
burden to the possessor of removing the danger. It explained that in all
the cases allowing recovery, "the danger could be eliminated at moderate
cost and effort .

.

.

. [T] he hazard which caused injury to the child was

confined to a small fixed location .... ,,11 The court noted that the
turntable in Thompson required only a simple locking device, the fence in
Altenbach could have been repaired with a minimum outlay of time and
money, the metal drum in Allen v. Silverman" 8 readily could have been
secured with blocks, the wall in Pattersonguarded for the evening, and the
gate in Bartleson locked. By its brief review of the prior cases discussing
this issue, the court made it plain that the remedies available in those cases
were quite simple in comparison to the expense of the precautions the. defendant railroad in Dugan would have to take once it was clear that children
trespassed at innumerable places along the line.:" 9 The combination of a
clear orientation to the clause in issue, consideration of the countervailing
social policies, and concise comparison with precedent resulted in a valuable
exposition of one small aspect of a superficially simple Restatement proviso.
In contrast with the extensive and valuable precedent treatment in
Bruce and Dugan, some circumstances call for an intensive comparison of
the case to be decided with a single prior determination. This is the type
of treatment which should have been accorded the Rush decision by the
115 See text accompanying notes 107-08 supra.
6
11
The facts are related in text accompanying note 74 supra.
117 387 Pa. 25, 33, 127 A.2d 343, 347 (1956).
118 355 Pa. 471, 50 A.2d 275 (1947). The facts are related in text following note
61 supra.
119 In completing its thorough analysis of clause (d), the court also discussed
relevant pre-339 precedent. See 387 Pa. at 37-39, 127 A.2d at 349.
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opinion in Cooper, so as to delineate just what facts would be sufficient
to charge the possessor of land with knowledge of a latent dangerous
condition. In Hyndnan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 120 an eleven-year-old boy
was injured when he came into contact with a poorly insulated electric wire
after mounting a platform holding a power transformer. Since the focus
of inquiry was upon whether reasonable means of minimizing the risk
were available to defendant railroad, careful comparison with Dugan was
appropriate. The plaintiff proposed several devices for reducing the danger
other than the ineffective anticlimb gate on the ladder leading up the pole
to the platform. In finding for the plaintiff on this issue, the court explained that, while insulation of the overhead wires in Dugan would have
made railroad operations impossible, the two short wires of the transformers easily could have been insulated. The court also pointed out that,
while protective devices at each of the more than 800 similar transformer
poles along defendant's rights-of-way would require substantial expenditures, the case was distinguishable from Dugan in that there was no evidence of children playing around the other poles,' 21 whereas there had
been evidence of frequent trespass on many other parts of the right-of-way
in Dugan; hence, precautions in the one area would have been realistic in
Hyndinan.
In both Dugan and Hyndnan opposing counsel were the same, and
all relevant precedents were thoroughly analyzed in the briefs; this illustrates the indispensable role played by the bar in bringing the relevant
precedent to the court's attention. Given the traditional operation of the
adversary system and the pressure of a large workload, the courts
cannot be expected to uncover great numbers of cases, sua sponte. However, in several of the instances in which deficiencies in the use of precedent
have been discussed, the parties' briefs had called attention to and provided
some analysis of the relevant decisions; in addition there are less than
twenty-five Pennsylvania decisions interpreting section 339.
III.

TECHaNICAL SKILLS

A. Accuracy in Using Precedent
The prior discussion of the sufficient use of precedent naturally assumes that it will be dealt with carefully and accurately. While not
willful, there are a few instances of misstatement or other erroneous use
of precedent. In Cooper, while reversing a judgment n.o.v. in favor of the
defendant city, the court affirmed a judgment in favor of defendant railroad.
The pool in which the minors had drowned encroached upon the railroad's
land, but the court held that the railroad could not be said to have "maintained" the hazardous condition, a requirement established in that part of
120 396 Pa. 190, 152 A.2d 251 (1959).
121 In Hyndman the defendant conceded that clause (a) had been satisfied, there
being a boy scout camping site fifty feet from the transformer and evidence that
scouts had climbed this pole previously. 396 Pa. at 195, 152 A.2d at 254.
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section 339 which precedes clause (a). The court properly acknowledged
that it had held in Gallagherv. Frederick 122 that a landowner can be held
to have maintained a condition which another person has created, but
purported to distinguish Gallagher on the ground that it "obviously refers
to conditions the presence of which the landowner knows and permits to
exist," whereas there was "not a scintilla of evidence that the railroad had
any actual knowledge that the pool had encroached upon its land." 12 This
misstates the Gallaghercase. In that case a child of just under three years
of age was burned by a fire built on defendant's property by trespassing
children. Recovery was denied on the ground that fires, which had been
built sporadically by children, were detrimental to defendant's property and
in no way inhered in any artificial conditions on the land, and thus could not
be said to be maintained by him. However, in discussing the issue of
maintenance of the injury-causing condition, the court noted that "complaints had been made to the defendant husband that children were getting
hurt on the lot but, so far as the record discloses, such complaints were
confined to the physical condition of the materials which the defendant
husband had placed upon the lot." 124 The court expressly stated that defendants' knowledge of the frequent building of fires "was constructive as
the owners and users of the lot resident [sic] around the corner." 125
Hence while Gallagheris a holding for defendant on the maintenance issue,
it clearly does not rest on the absence of actual knowledge by the landowner; in fact it suggests that constructive knowledge would be sufficient.
This is not to say that Cooper is indistinguishable from Gallagherin regard
to the knowledge element of maintenance, since the proximity of defendant's residence to the lot in Gallagher might provide a more reasonable
basis for imposing constructive notice on the possessor of land in that case.
The essential point is that the proferred distinction did not exist.126
There is an instance in Dugan in which the failure to cite a prior decision was misleading. In delineating the principles of law which governed
the case, the opinion stated that section 339 "supersedes and supplants the
doctrine of 'attractive nuisance' and the 'playground rule,'" 127 citing
Thompson, McGill v. United States 128 and Prosser.129 However, although
it is true that once 339 was accepted as providing a cause of action the
playground rule no longer had any vitality, the fact is that the case immediately preceding the Dugan decision, Scibelli v. Pennsylvania R.R.,130
122 366 Pa. 450, 77 A.2d 427 (1951).
12 Cooper v. Reading, 392 Pa. 452, 459, 140 A.2d 792, 795 (1958).
124 366 Pa.
125 Ibid.

at 453, 77 A.2d at 428.

26
1
The court in Cooper did discuss briefly the insufficiency of the grounds for
imposing constructive notice on the defendant railroad. 392 Pa. at 459-60, 140 A2d
795-96.
127 Dugan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 387 Pa. 25, 31, 127 A.2d 343, 346 (1956).
128 200 F.2d 873 (3d Cir. 1953).
12 9
PROSSm,, TORTS § 77 (2d ed. 1955).
130 379 Pa. 282, 108 A2d 348 (1954).
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was decided solely in terms of the playground rule. While the move to
eliminate a doctrine which was nothing but an unnecessary complication
of the law on liability to child trespassers was desirable and overdue, in so
doing it was incumbent on the court to deal expressly with Scibelli and
explain what change it was making. While it is at times desirable to
create an appearance of continuity, to do so here was unwise since a bald
statement that the playground rule had been superseded, unaccompanied by
any reference to Scibelli, was likely to create confusion and uncertainty
among the personal injury bar and lower court bench.
An instance of failure to discuss precedent in Cooper clearly constituted inaccuracy. After relating the facts, the court summarized the
lower court's bases for its judgment for defendants notwithstanding the
verdict. The first ground appears to be that the injury-causing condition
was not artificial, 131 as required by section 339; the opinion of the lower
court expressly stated that the pond with the "hidden stepoff" was a natural
condition.13 2 Unless the court intended to abrogate the artificial condition
requirement, which is doubtful in view of its repeated reference to "artificial
conditions" in discussing the "maintenance" issue, its reversal in favor of
plaintiff against one defendant embodies a sub silentio overturning of the
lower court's finding. The failure to treat this issue explicitly is unfor133
tunate in view of the existence of the decision in McGuire v. Carey,
turning solely on the natural-artificial distinction. McGuire held for defendant on the ground that a stream in and around which children were
known to frolic frequently was a natural condition, so that the landowner
could not be liable for the drowning of a seven-year-old who fell through
while attempting to cross the frozen surface. The changes in the stream
due to erosion, and possibly some blasting done in the area a number of
years before, were discounted by the court; yet the deep center of the pool
in Cooper was solely the result of erosion. Cooper may be distinguishable
because the substantial erosion caused by the heavy flow of water from the
outlet pipe created a trap-like condition, but this is no reason for altogether
ignoring the McGuire precedent: the cases seem to demand comparison. 3 4
B. Dictum 135
The line of opinions dealt with in this paper cannot be criticized for
the frequent appearance of dangerously broad, loose language. However,
'3' Cooper v. Reading, 392 Pa. 452, 457, 140 A.2d 792, 794 (1958).
132 Cooper v. Reading, 49 Berks 1, 6-7 (C.P. Berks County, Pa., 1956).
133 366 Pa. 627, 79 A.2d 236 (1951) (per curiam).
34
'
The briefs of the city and the railroad did not argue the relevance of the
McGuire decision.
135 Several issues which have been treated elsewhere in this paper could be included under this heading. For example, the propriety of discussing more than
necessary for disposition of the case has ramifications here. Also, the problems in
Dugan's attempt to expunge the playground rule and the court's assertion in Jennings
that contributory negligence was not an issue in the case are relevant as reflecting
the dangers of imprecision which arise when the case could have been handled without
the statements.
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the opinion in the recent case of Dragonjac v. McGaflin Constr. & Supply
Co.136 does contain a statement which the court most probably had no intention of making, and which well illustrates the dangers of such carelessness.
In the final paragraph of the opinion, 3 7 the court lists as one of its reasons
for denying recovery that "the minor plaintiff and his parents assumed the
risk." 138 The italicized words call for inquiry into the standard of care
required of parents and consideration of the issue of imputed negligencethat is, whether negligence by a parent can bar recovery by the minor child.
It has long been settled in Pennsylvania that while contributory negligence
of parents may bar their recovery in a derivative action, it will not be imputed to their injured child who is suing by his father or mother as
guardian. 39 In addition it is not negligent for a parent to allow his child
to walk or play unattended as do others of his age.140 Contributory negligence of a parent was considered and rejected in an earlier section 339
case 141 under similar circumstances, 14 yet this case was never mentioned
in the Dragonjac opinion. Section 339 makes no reference to a duty of
care owed by parents. While this should not preclude the court from making it an operative consideration, it is difficult to believe that this was intended by the court in Dragonjacin view of the total absence of elaboration.
If there was any such intention, it seems that the absence of mention of
the role of parents in the Restatement language placed on the court a positive duty to make plain what it was doing. As handled by the court, all
that has been accomplished is an injection of ambiguity.
IV. POLICY AND ADHERENCE TO THE TERMS OF THE RULE

The introductory portion of section 339 limits recovery under this section to injuries "caused by a structure or other artificial condition." In
McGuire v. Carey, 43 the court affirmed per curiam a nonsuit in favor of
defendant on the ground that the stream in which the plaintiff's decedent
child had drowned by falling through a spot of thin ice was a natural not
an artificial condition. Once there has been sufficient play in the area to
put the possessor on notice of trespassing youngsters, there is no apparent
reason for relieving the possessor from a duty of care merely because the
136409 Pa. 276, 186 A.2d 241 (1962).

137 See text accompanying note 66 supra.
138 409 Pa. at 280, 186 A.2d at 243. (Emphasis added.)
39 See Potanko v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 368 Pa. 582, 590-91, 84 A.2d 522, 526
(1951) ; Erie City P. Ry. Co. v. Schuster, 113 Pa. 412, 6 Ati. 269 (1886).
140 See, e.g., Buchanan v. Belusko, 361 Pa. 465, 468, 65 A.2d 386, 388 (1949);
Parznik v. Central Abattoir Co., 284 Pa. 393, 396, 131 At. 372, 373 (1925).
141 Patterson v. Palley Mfg. Co., 360 Pa. 259, 61 A.2d 861 (1948).
142 The court explained that a parent cannot be expected to pen in the house or
control all the actions of a child over ten years of age; in Dragonjac the minor was
also over ten. The court also pointed to the fact that parents had warned the child
to stay away from the danger area; there was also such a warning in Dragonjac.
See Dragonjac v. McGaffin Constr. & Supply Co., 409 Pa. 276, 278, 186 A.2d 241,
242 (1962) ; Patterson v. Palley Mfg. Co., 360 Pa. 259, 268, 61 A.2d 861, 865 (1948).
143 366 Pa. 627, 79 A.2d 237 (1951).
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dangerous condition is "natural." 144 To treat a drowning in a stream or
pond differently from one in a reservoir is to draw a distinction without
foundation. 45 Dean Prosser, in a suggested revision of section 339, would
abolish the natural-artificial dichotomy. 14
Principles of separation of powers confine judicial "fulfillment of
policy" to interstices and ambiguities when a statute is involved; however,
the courts work under no such limitation when dealing with a judicially
adopted "rule." While adoption of a formulation which gathers and lucidly
presents the considerations in a class of tort cases is desirable, the courts
must be cognizant of the object in adopting a "black-letter rule" and of its
inherent shortcomings. 147 Even when the underlying policy is undisputed,
the courts must be alert to look behind the language and, when necessary,
revise it to conform to the policy goals. In the words of Llewellyn:
The cure does not lie in chasing far and further. Where it lies is in
never failing, each time, to take at least one fresh look. The new
prodding of the new facts may bring something better into focus.
The queer subconscious may this time be ready to give up an out
which has been cooking down in there since the last time the court
48
walked through these legal sandblurs.1
While the primary function of this paper has been to emphasize the
importance of a court's taking all opportunities to clarify and sharpen
legal rules, slavish adherence to the terms of the rule can offset any advantage to be gained from employing it. Adoption of the rule can be a step
forward; it is never the end of the road.
Henry A. Gladstone t
144 Unfortunately, the plaintiff-appellant's brief did not argue the lack of logic
in this distinction.
'45 See Altenbach v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 349 Pa. 272, 37 A.2d 429 (1944) (allowing recovery for child who drowned in reservoir).
146 Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 CALn'. L. REv. 427, 469 (1959).
It is
particularly difficult to understand the Pennsylvania court's insensitivity on this issue
when in Gallagher v. Frederick, 366 Pa. 450, 77 A.2d 427 (1951), decided in the
same year as McGuire, the court ignored the origin of the condition stating that a
possessor can be held to have "maintained" a condition although it was brought upon
the premises by another by simply allowing it to remain. See Prosser, Mpra at 447.
147 "[T]he new theory emphasizes the importance of such laws as tools of scientific
procedure, even though cosmic validity has to be denied to them as patterns of absolute
truth." Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision, 79 U.
PA. L. REv. 833, 836 (1931).
See generally id. at 843-55
14 8
LLEwELLyx, THE CommoN LAW Ta.ADITIoN: DEcmIG APPEALS 293-94

(1960).
tLL.B. 1964, University of Pennsylvania.
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